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The European Currency Crisis
The catalyst for the September currency crisis in
Europe was the tension over the stance of mon-
etary policy in Germany and other countries in
the European Monetary System (EMS), the ar-
rangement that limits exchange rate fluctuations
among members. High German interest rates
were blamed for limiting the prospects for an
economic recovery in Europe by forcing other
members to keep their own rates high in order to
maintain the value of their currencies against the
German mark. Market speculation against the
parities set by the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the EMS has resulted in the devaluation
of several currencies against the mark, as well as
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and Italy
from the ERM.
These developments have raised new questions
about the current direction of German monetary
policy, the future of the EMS, and the prospects
of a European monetary union. This Weekly Let-
ter reviews and interprets these developments.
The Bundesbankand the EMS
Because Germany is the largest economy in
Europe, accounting for 25 percent of the Euro-
pean Community's output, its central bank, the
Bundesbank, is de facto the dominant central
bank in the EMS. The Bundesbank traditionally
has adopted aconservative monetary policy
stance and has gained credibility as an inflation
fighter. In the late 1980s annual consumer price
inflation in Germany averaged less than 2 per-
cent. In recent years, most EMS member coun-
tries have linked their currencies to the German
mark, because of the credibility it provides about
long-run inflation expectations. The link effec-
tively requires that they maintain their monetary
policies roughly in line with Germany's. It has
been generally felt that the gains in credibility
are worth the cost of losing some discretion over
domestic monetary policy.
This situation changed in mid-1990, however.
The rise in fiscal expenditures to achieve re-
unification with East Germany caused Germany's
general government budget deficit to grow from
near balance in 1989 to 2.5 percent of GNP in
1990 and to 4.4 percent of GNP in 1991. A real
demand shock of this nature generally leads to
higher real interest rates and a real appreciation
of a country's currency, which together reduce
the strain on domestic resources. (The U.s. fiscal
expansion of the early 1980s-namely, the tax
cuts and defense buildup-and the associated
dollar appreciation provides a similar example.)
And, indeed, the mark has appreciated both
in nominal and real terms against the dollar
and yen.
However, the constraints of the EMS limited the
nominal appreciation of the mark against the cur-
rencies of other member countries. Thus the pres-
sure for a real appreciation of the mark Within
the EMS has taken the form of relatively higher
inflation in Germany than in its neighbors.
But the Bundesbank has demonstrated its resolve
to limit the amount of price inflation not only in
the face ofthe costs of reunification, but also in
light ofwage settlements above 6 percent in 1991.
The Bundesbank responded to these inflationary
pressures by tightening monetary policy. The
discount rate was raised roughly 3 percentage
points between 1990 and mid-1992 to 8.75 per-
cent, the highest level since 1948.
As a result, the burden of achieving the neces-
sary real appreciation of the mark within the
EMS fell on other member countries who were
compelled to deflate in order to maintain their
currencies' link to the mark; that is, to defend
their currency parities with the mark, these coun-
tries matched the high German interest rates.
From the fourth quarter of 1990 to the fourth
quarter of 1991, consumer inflation increased by
1 percentage point in Germany, while decreasing
almost 6 percentage points in the United Kingdom,
and more than Y2 percentage point in France and
Italy. This deflationary trend has been accompa-
nied by a severe recession in the United King-
dom and sluggish growth in France, Italy, and
most other EMS members.
The exchange rate crisis
The catalyst for the exchange crisis was the ten-
sion between countries that want more stimu-
lative policies to lift their economies out ofFABSF
recession or sluggish growth and the Bundes-
bank, which is concerned about domestic
inflation and therefore wants high interest rates.
Interestingly, the crisis actually was triggered by
the devaluation of the Finnish markka on Sep-
tember 8, followed by market speculation against
the Swedish krona, which the Swedish author-
ities defended by sharply raising interest rates.
Though neither country is a member of the EMS,
both have "shadowed" the mark, and both have
experienced recessions. Then, just days before
the September 20 French vote on the Maastricht
Treaty on European economic and monetary
union, market speculation focused on the core
currencies of the EMS.
In response, on September 14 the Bundesbank
reduced its discount rate by 50 basis points to
8% percent and the Lombard rate (the rate
charged for supplemental bank borrowing) by 25
basis points to 9% percent. At the sametime the
Italian lira was devalued by 7 percent to offset
speculation against it. The German rate declines
were below expectations, however, contributing
to further foreign exchange speculation against
the weaker currencies in the ERM. In response to
these attacks, the United Kingdom and Italy both
withdrew from the ERM and their currencies de-
preciated. The Spanish peseta also was devalued
5 percent.
Despite these currency realignments within the
EMS, the first since 1987, pressures persisted. The
pound continued to float down freely as the U.K.
reduced interest rates. By September 22, the
Bank of England had lowered its base lending
rate to 9 percent, down from a peak of 15 per-
cent in the midst of the currency crisis and the
lowest level since 1988. To defend the peseta,
the Bank of Spain reinstituted capital controls on
September 23. France's slim approval (51 per-
cent) of the Maastricht Treaty did not significantly
reduce speculative pressure on the French franc.
In response, the Bank of France raised interest
rates, and French officials repeatedly expressed
their determination to avoid a devaluation of the
franc, pointing to relatively strong French eco-
nomic fundamentals (particularly inflation and
government finances).
The direction of German monetary policy?
The recent crisis raised concerns about eco-
nomic recovery in Europe, the future viability of
the EMS, and the prospects of aEuropean mon-
etary union. German policymakers have been
confronted with the need to balance the respon-
sibilities ofmaintaining international arrange-
ments against traditional domestic policy
concerns. On the one hand, the German de-
cision to lower interest rates may have been
expected to ease exchange rate tensions in the
EMS. Clearly, however, the markets viewed
the German move as "too Iittle, too late" to
limit speculative currency pressures.
Perhaps more important, the reduction in Ger-
man rates is consistent with concerns over a
slowing economy and some easing of inflation-
ary pressure. In 1991 (Q4/Q4) GNP growth was
only 1 percent, and was in fact negative during
each of the last three quarters of the year. In the
first half of 1992 the German economy has not
shown signs of resuming any significant growth.
Real GNP fell at an annual rate of 1 percent in
the second quarter, compared to a rise of over 7
percent in the first quarter. But the first quarter's
apparently strong performance is attributed to an
unusually mild winter which limited normal de-
clines in outside business activity.
Other signs that Germany's economy is doing
poorly include a 4.5 percent fall in industrial
production reported in June over the preceding
year, a 6.8 percent decline in retail sales, and a
rise in unemployment to 6.7 percent in July, up
from 6.2 percent at the beginning of the year.
Moreover, although inflation remains a significant
concern, recent inflation signs have been good.
Consumer inflation fell from 4.3 percent in June,
to 3.3 percent in July, and to 2.5 percent in Au-
gust, measured as an average of the latest three
months over the previous three months at an
annual rate.
While the cut in German interest rates appar-
ently represents a change in the direction of
German monetary policy, there are reasons to
believe that the Bundesbank may proceed cau-
tiously. Concerns include the magnitude of the
increasing government budget deficits, how they
will be financed, and the emerging pattern of
wage settlements for 1993.
Furthermore, the Bundesbank is concerned about
the rapid growth ofthe broad money supply.
Over the first eight months of 1992, Germany's
M3 has grown at an annual rate of almost 9 per-
cent, well above the Bundesbank's target range
of 3.5-5.5 percent. However, there are reasons
to attribute the overshooting of money growthIn light of recent events, this timetable may be
unachievable for the majority of members of the
EMS. A likely scenario is a two-tier process.
Those countries with the strongest currencies-
Germany, the Benelux countries, and perhaps
France-might link their currencies and mone-
tary policies more tightly in the next few years
and move, perhaps on the original timetable,
towards a common currency. The others with
weaker currencies, including the U.K., Spain,
and Italy, would retain more monetary independ-
ence to focus on domestic economic conditions.
monetary policy for all EC members. The Maas-
tricht Treaty, drafted by a special summit of EC
leaders in Oecember1991, requires approval of
all 12 members of the EC. It calls for establishing
a European Monetary Institute to be run by the
governors of national central banks with the goal
of "coordinating" monetary policies and "pre-
paring" for a common currency on january 1,
1994. It also calls for a single currency and an
independent European central bank on january I,
1997 if a majority of countries have achieved
what the treaty calls "convergence" as measured
in terms ofa country's inflation, interest rates, and
budget deficits. Otherwise, a single currency is to
be created on January 1, 1999 by those countries
that have met the convergence requirements.
targets to special factors that exaggerate the infla-
tion potential. In particular, the inverted German
yield curve, with short-term rates (9 percent)
considerably above long-term rates (8.5 percent
or less) has induced German savers to hold more
short- and medium-term interest-bearing bank
deposits. In addition, M3 may provide a less reli-
able yardstick of future inflation because much of
the recent growth can be associated with an in-
crease in bank credit through subsidized lending
to eastern Germany where money transaction
demand may be somewhat higher.
Future of EMS and the European Union?
The EMS was intended to provide European
countries with the benefits of predictable curren-
cy rates at the cost of limited monetary indepen-
dence. But tryingto maintain the system of stable
parities under the pressure of differing national
economic fundamentals, in turn leading to shifts
in equilibrium exchange rates, proved very diffi-
cult. The German unification shock was the most
important fundamental shock, but additional
tensions were bound to arise. First, the pound
entered into the ERM (October 1990) during a
period of double-digit inflation in the United
Kingdom, and second, Italy has yet to re50lve
an unsustainable position of government deficits
that exceed 10 percent of GOP and debt levels
above 100 percent of GOP.
The currency crisis in Europe forced exchange
rate parities to reflect more accurately the eco-
nomic fundamentals, but it also may have slowed
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